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COMMENT
THE DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS
Amos J. Peasleet
Two basic assumptions are permissible:
First, we enthusiastically support the settlement of international disputes
by judicial and pacific means. We would limit the legal right of "self-help"
by any nation about as tightly as it is limited respecting individuals under the
Penal Law, where the right is granted in six specific and restricted
New York
1
cases.
Secmd, we are fairly hard-headed lawyers, and are not open to the criticism of being "visionary" or "perfectionists." We appreciate the practical difficulties of procuring agreement among the nations upon any plan.
We endorse, presumably, almost unanimously the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals
as being a, distinct advance in the right direction. Since the Secretary of State2
tells us that they are better than any plan proposed by any single nation,
some of us may be a little disappointed, however, that our own government did
not present a still better plan, even if unsuccessful in procuring assent of the
other three participating nations.
For many years I have had a theory that our leaders in public affairs have
tended to underestimate the popular desire in this country and among the
so-called common people throughout the world to create more perfect organs
of world government. I think that desire may be underestimated in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.
There are two chapters in these proposals which deal with the settlement
of international disputes. The Court Chapter 3 is satisfactory as far as it goes.
Its ultimate sufficiency will depend upon the details yet to be worked out
regarding the proposed judicial statute.
The Chapter which relates to the "pacific settlement of disputes," 4 suggests
procedures which have wrecked many confederations .in history.
The Court Chapter
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals contemplate either a continuance of the
present World Court or the creation of a new one as the "principal" judicial
organ, under a statute to be prepared. That statute is to be either the existing one of the Permanent Court of International Justice with some modifications, or a new similar statute. The proposals are broad enough to permit
tMember of the New York Bar.
Address at a joint session of members of the American Bar Association and the Committee on International Law of the New York State Bar Association on January 19, 1945.
1. N. Y.
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2. Rep. Sec'y State (Oct. 7, 1944).
3. Chap. VII, entitled "An International Court of Justice."
4. Chap. VIII, entitled "Arrangements for the Maintenance of International Peace
and Security Including Prevention and Suppression- of Aggression." -
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a complete system of permanent international courts which the American Bar
Association 5 and a number of other legal societies have already endorsed. 6
Whether the jurisdiction of the proposed international court or courts would
be "obligatory" or whether it would remain optional as now provided under
Article 36 of the Permanent Court Statute, is not stated in the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposals. Many Bar Associations are on record as favoring obligatory
jurisdiction. 7 The categories which are set forth in Article 368 are probably
acceptable to the majority of constitutional lawyers. Most such lawyers would
recommend that the statute of the court itself confer obligatory jurisdiction
regarding all disputes within those categories.
Two features of the present World Court are objectionable to many lawyers,
(1) the power to give "advisory opinions" which is a function of an attorney
general, not of a court; and (2) the plan of appointing national judges to
sit on the court in a case affecting a nation not already having one of Its
nationals on the court. That detracts from judicial impartiality and savors
of having a party be a judge in its own cause. Both of those features should
be eliminated, if possible.
The ultimate "Charter" for the proposed General International Organization, or the final proposed judicial statute, should therefore include provision
for both (a) a complete international judicial system, and (b) obligatory
jurisdiction of international courts over disputes which fall within the categories enumerated in Article 36 of the Statute of the present Court. It should
also discard advisory opinions and the plan of permitting nations to sit as
judges in their own cause.
The Council Chapter
The underlying theory of conferring jurisdiction upon the Security Council
to deal with certain types of disputes between nations, is that the public peace
must at all costs be preserved and that there is a class of disputes of a political character not susceptible of treatment judicially.
The old League Covenant and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals encourage
the Council to investigate such matters and to endeavor to induce the parties
to settle them. If such efforts are not successful the new Security Council is
to "take any measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace
and security," including the "use of armed force ...

to give effect to its deci-

sions." Emphasis is laid upon "demonstrations, blockade and other operations
by air, sea or land forces of members of the organization."
The plan is unquestionably responsive to a world-wide determination not
(1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 545.
6. American Society of International Law; American Foreign Law Association; Federal Bar Association; American Branch of the International Law Association.
7. See notes 5 and 6 supra.
8. "(a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation."
5.
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to tolerate perpetual bullying and banditry by nations any more than we do
by individuals. We may not be able to change the leopards' spots, but we are
going to control the leopards.
My criticism of the proposed functions of the Council is not of the objectives contemplated, but of the wisdom of having the Council assume judicial
functions and of emphasizing bristling threats of compulsion.
History has demonstrated repeatedly that prolonged public debate of delicate disputes between nations by political bodies often tends to aggravate the
disputes rather than to pacify them. Minor issues develop into major crises.
National sentiments become solidified beyond the power of any diplomatic
representations to change them. National alignments of third parties are encouraged respecting matters in which other nations have no direct interest.
The nations by united action should outlaw self-help except as expressly
authorized in specific circumstances. International crime and breaches of the
peace must be sternly prevented or punished. The basic rights of all nations
should be defined and declared. The nations by united action should provide
an adequate judicial system whereby any aggrieved nation may have its
day in court. There must also be a deliberative body or bodies, properly and
fairly constituted, with power to change the status quo of international law.
But the Security Council plan as outlined in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals savours ominously of the political coalitions which have plagued Europe
for centuries. It is certainly not the American plan of constitutional government, which has been adopted by the vast majority of the people of the world
in their own national organizations. One of the smartest political actions ever
taken in history was when our forefathers 'in 1789 lifted the settlement of
inter-state disputes out of the old Continental Congress-a deliberative body
composed of diplomatic representatives of states in their political capacitiesand vested jurisdiction over such controversies in a supreme judicial body. 9
There are, It is true, some political questions which the Supreme Court will
decline to determine, but the practice has become well nigh universal of
having the states settle their differences by suit before the Supreme Court
rather than by Congressional action.
No practical constitutional lawyer expects to see an international federation
precisely in the pattern of the United States of America or of any other federated nation, but it is wise to ponder upon experience gained in such governmental organization. If a political or diplomatic body such as the new proposed Security Council is to be encouraged to take up and try to settle all
delicate political disputes between nations, the program may lead to further
impasses and crises which may imperil again the entire system.
The promise of "demonstrations," sanctions, and armed force will not, in
practice, prevent fanatical national sentiment from forcing issues. Nor will
solemn declarations of solidarity now assure united action by individual na9. The old Articles of Confederation had said: "The United States In Congress assembled shall . . . be the last resort on appeal in all disputes . . . between two or more

States."
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tions when a crisis arises. An avalanche of threats of force, even if originally
accepted in a signed document, may tend, as time proceeds, to injure sensitive feelings of small nations, to create irritations because of divers interpretations of the words, and eventually to cause disintegration of the organization and another still more bloody war.
There was no wiser man in the American Constitutional Convention than
James Madison. He was even wise enough in one instance to change his own
mind. Madison drafted a proposed clause for incorporation in our Constitution
almost identical in purport to Section VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals
and Article 10 of the League Covenant. 10 Alexander Hamilton, though the
staunchest supporter of Union in the entire convention, convinced Madison
and the Convention that the inclusion of such express threats in the Constitutional document would cause the system to break down. 11
If the answer to my questioning of the wisdom of these clauses of the
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals be that Hamilton and Madison were planning a
"super-government," whereas the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals involve no such
creation, I can only say that I do not know what a "super-government" is,
and I do not care what the proposed new organization is called. I cannot
conceive of international law at all, nor of any kind of an international organization, except as limiting to some extent the sovereign powers of individual
governments.
What I do want is an organization powerful and enduring enough to insure
a reasonable amount of peace and justice, and, if possible, to prevent my
sons and yours, and their sons and grandsons, from being killed on the field
of battle. If that is feasible under any plan I want my government to stand
for that plan and to insist upon it, and I will not quarrel about the language
on the label.
10. The "Virginia plan" introduced May 29, 1787 proposed that Congress be authorized "to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to
fulfill its duties under the Articles thereof." 1 FARRAND, RECORDS Or THE FEDERAL CoNVmNTiroN (rev. ed. 1937) 21.
11. In his articles in The Federalist, Hamilton developed this thought further, as
follows:
"Whoever considers the populousness and strength of several of these states singly at
the present juncture, and looks forward to what they will become,- even at the distance of
half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their movements by laws, to operate upon them in their collective capacities, and
to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the same capacities. A project of this
kind is little less romantic than the monster-taming spirit, which is attributed to the
fabulous heroes and demigods of antiquity.
Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members smaller than many
of our counties, the principle of legislation for sovereign states, supported by military
coercion, has never been found effectual. It has rarely been attempted to be employed,
but against the weaker members; and in most instances attempts to coerce the refractory
and disobedient, have been the signals of bloody wars; in which one-half of the confederacy has displayed its banners against the other half." XVI HAM.rILTON, THE FEDERALIST

(new ed. 1852) 73, 74.

